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NatioNalism aNd ReligioN: 
HistoRical aspects of tHe RelatioNsHip
Ioannis Kyriakantonakis
abstract: Religion and nationalism are conventionally considered as the forces par 
excellence that have shaped, respectively, the traditional and modern worlds. This article 
presents the eclectic affinities between religion and nationalism, but it also goes beyond 
the historical dichotomy of religious pre-modernity versus nationalist modernity. it 
suggests that their relationship is not one-dimensional, rejecting the idea that nationalism 
is constructed solely with modern fabrics while religion only relates to the context of 
traditional society. Rather, it argues that the relationship between tradition and modernity 
is a dynamic one; this builds on a methodological framework that makes use of varied and 
even opposing theories of nationalism. The relationship is studied in different national 
and confessional contexts and eras, but it is mainly the association of greek ethnicity/
nationalism and orthodox christianity that provides the empirical evidence for the 
theoretical argumentation.
A Theoretical Outline
The relationship between religion and nationalism can be examined in two 
schematic, conventional ways. on the one hand, it may be considered in a 
positive way, viewing religion as a defining, cementing element of national 
identity; on the other, it might be taken negatively, stressing the destruction 
of the religious ecumenical order,1 or of the “imagined community” of the 
church (in the case of christianity), as a consequence of and, at the same time, 
presupposing an emerging loyalty to the nation. in the latter case, one can 
also refer to internal developments within christianity with groundbreaking 
political and ideological implications. This article mainly discusses the branches 
of christianity and the ways that nations existed through cultural, dogmatic 
and ideological substrata – how modernity emerged from traditional society 
by incorporating previous languages and old meanings into new contexts and 
modern historical circumstances. in some cases ruptures and breaks with 
tradition occurred, while in several other cases continuities were more visible. 
1 Roger g. collingwood, The Idea of History, oxford: oxford University press, 1994, pp. 
49–52. 
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after all, it is the dialogue between continuity and change that constitutes the 
essence of the course of history and its philosophies. 
Nationalism and religion are complex subjects of historical sociology that 
permeate each other in various ways depending on the historical context. Here, 
we may follow eric Hobsbawm’s acknowledgement that their relationship can 
be elusive and diverse, “certainly resisting simple generalization”.2 Reducing 
national and religious identity to a relationship of general and specific – whereby 
religion would be a constituent part of a whole (national identity), always playing 
an instrumental role – would be in a sense short-sighted, despite the fact that 
religion played this role to a significant extent in several historical cases. in the 
same way, we should doubt the existence of a clear-cut dichotomy in historical 
sociology distinguishing between religious pre-modernity and the secular 
modernity of the era of nationalism.
Hobsbawm argued that the relationship between religion and national 
identity became operational when nationalism evolved into a powerful movement 
and ideology, and not during its initial stage, when it was confined to a minority 
movement of pioneers and disciples (intellectuals, merchants, bourgeois).3 from 
a Weberian perspective, this assessment could be viewed as a plausible marxist 
hypothesis, which reserves to religion the instrumental role within a political 
and economic system of authority that is expected in such an approach. The 
structure of this proposition is that of an ideal type – a non-restrictive analysis 
of religion and the church as grand repositories of symbols, cults, rites and 
sacred icons.4 These repositories, an immense concentration of meaning and a 
renowned method of communication through rituals, were not disregarded by 
nationalism; on the contrary, they were integrated in the “imagined community” 
that came to replace the old one.5 Nationalism, though in several of its aspects a 
revolutionary movement, did not renounce ancestral rites and the idea of sacred 
faith; ecclesiastical authorities accepted the nation as a convenient or necessary 
partner in order to reinstate religion in the circumstances of modernity and to 
2 eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, 
cambridge: cambridge University press, 1990, p. 71.
3 ibid., pp. 67–68.
4 see also anthony smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation, oxford: oxford University 
press, 1999, p. 193.
5 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, pp. 68, 71–72. anderson proposed that 
nationalism “has to be understood by aligning it […] with the large cultural systems that 
preceded it, out of which – as well as against which – it came into being.” see Benedict 
anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
london: Verso, 1995, p. 12.
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perpetuate in this way its significance in shaping “fraternities and affinities of 
men, who, otherwise would not have so much in common”.6
a relevant question could be addressed in the present context: whether and 
in what sense nationalism constituted a religion, a cult in its own right, and 
whether it required and thus introduced its own “theology”. in several cases of 
national emancipation, national churches were established, but according to 
Benedict anderson, nationalism also constituted a version of soteriology, and 
responded to humankind’s drive for salvation. indeed, nationalism had its own 
rites and festivals and relied on its martyrs, who had suffered for the nation 
(and, perhaps, simultaneously for their religious faith); this “religion” also had 
a kind of “priesthood”, consisting of an intelligentsia gifted with a particular 
charisma or “revelation” and prone to utter the “prophecies” of nationalism. 
above all, nationalism responded to the quest for salvation and constituted “a 
secular transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning” 
and “chance into destiny”.7 However, contrary to religious (mainly christian) 
dogmas, nationalism did not claim an ecumenical truth and revelation. By 
definition, it had to exclude the vast majority of the human race from its rites 
and prophecies, which were usually the privileged realm of a chosen people.8 
it has been pointed out that religion was linked to the nation within a 
concrete historical context, a social reality remote from most of its pre-modern 
metaphysical features.9 it is difficult to argue that the old sacred communities 
of christianity continued to exist in the same way after the emergence of 
nationalism, perpetuating their sense of uninterrupted time and identity. on 
the other hand, the ecumenical church was also a historical construct, and in 
reality, schisms and ecclesiastical discords had prevailed since the middle ages. 
still, the (canonically) legitimised breakup of the church into several national 
churches should be regarded as an ideological development of fundamental 
6 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, p. 68.
7 anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 11–12, carlton J.H. Hayes, Nationalism: A 
Religion, New York: macmillan, 1960, pp. 15, 16, 18.
8 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, p. 176. Judaism is, of course, a distinct case and 
the idea of a chosen people derived from its religious discourses, cf. anthony smith, Chosen 
Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity, New York: oxford University press, 2003, 
particularly chaps. 3 and 4; eric Voegelin, Order and History, vol. 1, Israel and Revelation, 
columbia: University of missouri press, 2001; michael Walzer, Exodus and Revolution, New 
York: Basic Books, 1985, p. 71f. 
9 mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular 
State, Berkeley: University of california press, 1994, pp. 27–28.
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significance.10 moreover, anderson has suggested that the nation, “as an imagined 
community”, was not a mere substitution of previous religious communities 
and dynastic states, but a dramatic change of worldview, which is relevant to 
radically novel conceptions of time and the reconceptualisation of history as a 
linear sequence of causes and consequences as well as evolutionary stages.11 This 
relatively schematic and unhistorical analysis of the emergence of modernity 
as an estrangement from previous modes of thought focuses on phenomena of 
secularisation. anderson’s secular time can be related to his comparison between 
the language of truth and revelation of the church and the several vernaculars 
of “the era of printed capitalism” which led to nationalism. language, like time, 
lost its metaphysical aspect, or rather what was abandoned was the conviction 
that only a sacred language ensures knowledge of god’s word.12 
The translation of the gospel became a critical cultural presupposition of 
nationalism, not only because it provided vernaculars with an elevated status, but 
also because it was an important aspect of the Reformation, which, it could be argued, 
contributed significantly to the demise of traditional religious communities.13 The 
Reformation essentially abolished the church and the sacraments and replaced 
them with individual access to god’s word through the Bible (sola scriptura).14 
textual authority, the resulting legalistic spirit (similar to that in Judaism), the 
undermining of ecclesiastical mediation and the transformation of religion into a 
10 However, since the middle ages, a number of doctrinal schisms have been attributed 
to the distinct character of ethnic groups. for example, the filioque controversy, that is, the 
addition to the creed of the double procession of the Holy spirit (from the father and the 
son), was regarded by Byzantine and even Roman theologians as a “frankish novelty” relating 
to simplified views that the franks held on christian dogma. other heresies, such as arianism 
and monophysitism, were also identified with concrete ethnicities and geographical regions; 
see John meyendorff, Byzantine Theology. Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes, New York: 
fordham University press, 1983, pp. 91–101; Judith Herrin, The Formation of Christendom, 
New Jersey: princeton University press, 1987, pp. 220ff, 426–428, 439–444. 
11 anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 22, 36, 194. perhaps the concept of the “discovery 
of history”, or of historical consciousness, would not be accepted by scholars of intellectual 
history such as arnaldo momigliano, who argued in favour of continuity in traditions of 
history writing, suggesting that ecclesiastical history in fact influenced the emergence of 
modern historical science: see The Classical Foundations of Modern Historiography, Berkeley: 
University of california press, 1990, pp. 132–156.
12 anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 14–15.
13 ibid., pp. 39, 40; liah greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, cambridge: 
Harvard University press, 2001, pp. 51, 53–54; adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood: 
Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism, cambridge: cambridge University press, 1999, 35–65.
14 max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, london: Unwin, 1965, 
pp. 104–105, 123.
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code of practical moral precepts and duties are some of the elements that may be 
relevant to a study in the sociology of religion in the era of nationalism. 
max Weber did not explicitly refer to the nation and nationalism in his 
essay on the protestant ethic.15 But other authors, such as liah greenfeld, have 
clearly stressed protestantism and the Reformed faith as critical factors in the 
birth of nationalism. apart from england, where protestant and national causes 
initially intermingled, it appears in general that nationalism and national identity 
could not emerge ex nihilo as radical rifts that disregarded preexistent cultural 
structures and persisting religious allegiances of ethnic groups.16 The theory 
of types of nationalism, that is, of Western and eastern models, posits those 
preexisting elements of culture as the causes of distinct roads to modernity, and 
it thus highlights religion as a decisive factor in the formation of either a secular/
rational nationalism (if such a species ever existed), or an “organic” and ethnic 
version characterised by elements of mystique.17
Rationalisation is indeed central to the assessment of the position of religion 
within a modern society, in comparison to its influence during the middle 
ages or antiquity. Weber analysed the disenchantment of the world due to 
bureaucratic systems of legitimate authority, the routinisation of charisma and 
the rationalisation of religion. He traced the origins of these historical processes 
to the emergence of prophecy as a consistent religious plan, part of broader godly 
providence revealed to a chosen people only; he also cited the idea of religion as 
a normative and moral system, the observation of which was the only means of 
salvation.18 later on, Jewish-type legalism re-emerged in the context of puritan 
moralism, which Weber related to the spirit of capitalism and the rational plan 
in enterprises and offices that constituted the core of modernity. 
Rationalisation as a historical phenomenon did not escape the attention 
of authors interested in the emergence of nationalism in “god’s firstborn” 
15 Weber’s perception of social reality as essentially symbolic is of primary importance 
for theories on nations and nationalism. greenfeld, Five Roads to Modernity, pp. 17, 18; for 
a more complex interpretation of social reality, see max Weber, Economy and Society: An 
Outline of Interpretive Sociology, vol. 2, Berkeley: University of california press, 1978, pp. 
394–398, 921–926.
16 anthony smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, New York: Blackwell, 1988, pp. 24, 35.
17 smith, Ethnic Origins of Nations, pp. 139, 141–142, 146; Hans Kohn, “Western and 
eastern Nationalism”, in Nationalism, ed. anthony smith and John Hutchinson, oxford: 
oxford University press, 1994, p. 165. for a critical approach to theories of civic/Western and 
eastern nationalisms, see Walker connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, 
princeton: princeton University press, 1994. 
18 Weber, Protestant Ethic, pp. 117–118, 123. 
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nation, sixteenth-century england.19 and the significance of the concept and 
self-image of a chosen people received extensive comments from scholars 
working according to the ethno-symbolic approach that insisted on religious 
self-depictions of ethnic groups, long before the emergence of nationalism as a 
basic element of modernity.20
Chosen Peoples
ethnic or early national21 history was very often identified with religious or 
ecclesiastical history. in some cases, constitutive myths of descent referred to 
heroic ancestors who were also the founding fathers of religious congregations.22 
The case of the Jews is, of course, the most characteristic.23 according to anthony 
smith, Jewish people indicate the significance of religion as a condition of ethnic 
persistence; that is, religion is instrumental in the formation of national identity, 
mainly through ancient symbols, memories and myths. ethnic entities have thus 
survived through religious customs and rites. in the case of christianity, they existed 
in congregations, ritual communities of the eucharist centred around bishops. 
smith has analysed the way in which ethnic groups preserved their identities and 
the reasons for which some of them managed to survive whereas others vanished.24 
His analysis is not confined to the Jews, but among others, the author mentions 
the greeks and the armenians as examples of peoples who, through the middle 
ages and early modern era, attributed their continuing existence to their churches, 
particularly when they faced captivity, immigration or exile.25 
as far as the greeks are concerned, this idea is very significant. indeed, it was 
for the most part through religion and the church’s leading role in education, 
19 greenfield, Five Roads to Modernity, chap. 1. for a critical view on greenfeld’s and other 
modernist approaches, see Hastings, Construction of Nationhood, p. 89. 
20 smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation, p. 58. 
21 from a historical perspective, the term “ethnic” may raise some questions. it is not 
clear whether the distinction of ethnies to nations is historically grounded, in the sense 
that historical peoples do not seem to have conceived of it. in general, there is a conceptual 
confusion of terms such as national identity, nationalism, ethnicity and ethnie that should not 
be overlooked: anthony smith, “Nationalism: a trend Report and Bibliography”, Current 
Sociology 11 (1973), 25–26: smith, Ethnic Origins of Nations, pp. 21–46. 
22 smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation, pp. 64, 131–132.
23 several greek neomartyrs were canonised by the church, but their sufferings at the 
hands of the turks also made them symbols of early (and later) greek patriotism. see tijana 
Krstić, Contested Conversions to Islam: Narratives of Religious Change in the Early Modern 
Ottoman Empire, stanford, california: stanford University press, pp. 121–164. 
24 smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation, p. 60. 
25 ibid., p. 128, 134.
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ideology and communal life (ethnarchy) that Hellenism was preserved as a 
distinct cultural entity vis-à-vis the ottomans.26 linguistic differentiation shared 
a similar role, but when it comes to the masses of the greek rural population, 
historical evidence indicates that religion’s cohesive power was far stronger.27 
The idea of linguistic purity as a kind of essence of a nation was part of a classicist 
vision projected by intellectuals of the enlightenment and nineteenth-century 
romanticism, although it was not unknown to greek intellectuals of previous 
centuries.28 
smith approached medieval and early modern national identity as cultural 
patterns centred on religion. indeed, he argued that it was only after the 
adoption of christianity that Hellenism acquired a unifying “moral pattern”; 
this developed after the schism between the latin and orthodox churches and 
particularly after the latin atrocities of 1204 and the experience of the subsequent 
Venetian and “frankish” rule in greece.29 in the face of the expansionist policies 
26 one should of course focus on who was greek (Hellene) and on the identity that this 
name (or its alternatives Romios and graikos) referred to from the fifteenth to eighteenth 
centuries. These questions are relevant to the definition and history of the nation as well as to 
early modern greek concepts of ethnicity. obviously, collective consciousness depends on 
historical circumstances. Historians have addressed these questions repeatedly, but it seems 
that a unanimously held view on greek identity cannot be provided to students of nationalism. 
The relevant historical context was approached in rather politicised and ideological ways 
and in my opinion few works could partially shed light on it. see athanasios d. angelou, 
“‘Who am i?’ scholarios’ answers and the Hellenic identity”, in Φιλέλλην: Studies in honour 
of Robert Browning, ed. costas constantinides, Nikolaos panagiotakes, elizabeth Jeffreys, 
athanasios angelou, Venice: Hellenic institute of Byzantine and post-Byzantine studies, 
1996, pp. 1–19. dimitris livanios, “pride, prudence and the fear of god: The loyalties of 
alexander and Nicholas mavrocordatos (1664–1730)”, Dialogos: Hellenic Studies Review 7 
(2000), 1–22. livanios approached the question of greek identity in a rather contested way in 
his article “The Quest for Hellenism: Religion, Nationalism and collective identities in greece 
(1453–1913)”, The Historical Review 3 (2006), 33–70. Recently, a conference held in athens by 
the department of History of the University of athens focused on collective identifications of 
the greeks: “ Έλλην, Ρωμηός, Γραικός: Συλλογικοί προσδιορισμοί και ταυτότητες”, athens, 
19–21 January 2017.
27 steven Runciman, The Great Church in Captivity, cambridge: cambridge University 
press, 1968, pp. 410–411.
28 That is the case of the phanariots: a purified, archaic greek language was a constituent of 
this elite’s cultural and political identity: livanios, “The loyalties of alexander and Nicholas 
mavrocordatos”, pp. 1–18.
29 The seizure of constantinople by “the latins” (the army of the fourth crusade and the 
Venetians) has been proposed as the dramatic incident after which the Byzantine sense of a 
“Roman” identity changed radically and henceforth revolved around a greek ethnic community. 
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of the reformed papacy, the greeks assumed the role of protecting orthodoxy, 
which granted them an elect status and a special cultural and political mission.
The notion of a sacred people endowed with the mission to guard a “true 
faith” prevailed among ethnic groups, as well as the idea of a god-given or 
promised land or city (as in the case of the Jews, greeks or turks).30 many 
symbols and motifs that later became popular among nationalist intellectuals and 
poets, such as the adoration of sacred landscapes or cities, had been previously 
used in popular contexts. The rediscovery of folk traditions (like folk songs) by 
modern intellectuals in order to serve ideological or educational requirements 
of newly established nation-states can be assessed as a specific condition of the 
romantic movement and its quest for articulating national character – a quest 
that presupposed a return to cultural identities that were based on elements of 
popular faith and cult. Now the belief in a special revelation, that is, in a special 
relationship with and assignment by god, is relevant to the notions of national 
supremacy. in several cases, elect peoples elaborated missionary or crusading 
programmes, preaching expansion in the name of god either by holy wars or 
by merely enlightening those “who lived in darkness”.31 
Hobsbawm referred to the role of ideas about salvation and that of religious 
cult in Russia. There, the image of a holy land and bulwark of orthodoxy 
was popular among the masses and was not invented or imposed from 
above.32 orthodoxy and Holy mother Russia constituted the quintessence 
of ethnonational identity, together with the vision of the Third Rome, which 
incorporated a missionary aspect previously attributed to the Byzantine empire.33 
see stephen g. Xydis, “mediaeval origins of modern greek Nationalism”, Balkan Studies 9 
(1968), pp. 1–20. other historical accounts traced this shift in ideology back to the reign of the 
comnenian dynasty. for an alternative account of Romanitas’ persistence, see gill page, Being 
Byzantine: Greek Identity before the Ottomans, cambridge: cambridge University press, 2008. 
30 smith, Myth and Memories of the Nation, 127, 135. see michael Herzfeld, Ours Once 
More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece, New York: pella, 1986, pp. 53–72; 
Robert shannan peckham, National Histories, Natural States: Nationalism and the Politics of 
Place in Greece, london: tauris, 2001, pp. 21–35, 49–60. 
31 smith, Myth and Memories of the Nation, pp. 130, 135. it is interesting that this 
enlightening agenda was pursued by greek intellectuals of constantinople during the era of 
reforms in the ottoman empire. in the context of what seems to be a nationalist rhetoric, they 
assumed an illuminating role among “the peoples of the east”. see germanos aphthonidis, 
“Πρόλογος του εκδότου” [editor’s introduction], athanassios comnenos-Ypsilantis, 
Εκκλησιαστικών και πολιτικών των εις δώδεκα βιβλίον Η΄ Θ΄ και Ι΄ ήτοι Τα Μετά την Άλωσιν 
[Books 8-10 from the 12 books on ecclesiastical and political events: the events after the 
conquest], constantinople: Vretos, 1870, pp. α΄–λα΄[i-xxxi]. 
32 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, p. 50.
33 ibid., p. 49.
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The Russian land, the sacred icons and the liturgy of the church, but also the 
tsar and his state, were tangible elements of holiness. in the present context, 
it is interesting to point out that the dividing line between the religious and 
national spheres was not clear. The idea of the nation as a bulwark of faith could 
not be disregarded by intellectuals of the nineteenth century, as the slavophile 
movement indicates. The latter reacted to previous reformative efforts of the tsars 
using motifs of ethnic identity, of the ancient Rus counter to the official Rossiya.34 
The important role held by religion in the initial phases of the european 
nations has also been assessed in the case of what smith has termed “aristocratic 
ethnies”. in this case, religious elements related mainly to political calculations 
and the legitimacy of autocratic rulers within a dynastic state.35 
france exemplifies the practice of deifying a ruling house, through the cult of 
royal blood and the worship of the most christian king; originally, he was framed 
as the protector of the catholic church and he later initiated the adoration 
of his person and france in a fervour that can only be compared to religious 
devotion. it was this special role and mission of the kings of france within the 
catholic world that assured for their people the elevation to a chosen people, 
similar to the case of their frankish ancestors, whom the popes hailed as a new 
kingdom of david.36 The capetian kings combined their claim to the frankish 
imperial inheritance with the role of those emperors, that is, the defence of the 
church and papacy. divine appointment (and right) of the king – the deification 
of his authority and realm – were manifested in his royal symbol, the fleur de 
lys, which was also the symbol of the Virgin mary, as well as in the coronation 
rite at Reims.37 greenfeld has referred to “sacralization by definition”, which 
reaffirmed the direct bond of the king with the lord Jesus and fused the cult of 
mary and the cult of royalty.38 
The exceptional catholicism of france permitted its emancipation from 
the papacy, which was nevertheless expressed and justified in religious terms. 
34 smith, Myth and Memories of the Nation, p. 134. Hobsbawm referred to an essentially 
demotic and folk perception of the holiness of Russia that was identified with the head of the 
church. in that respect, the cleavage between official state nationalism and demotic nationalism 
is interesting. The Russian man remained a Russky, whereas no word originating in the 
vocabulary of Rossiya, a neologism established by peter the great, succeeded in becoming 
prevalent as a description of the Russian people. Being Russian was thus identified with the 
dualism krestianin-christianin (peasant-christian), and with being a member of the orthodox 
community. Nations and Nationalism, pp. 50–51. 
35 smith, Myth and Memories of the Nation, pp. 134, 136.
36 ibid., p. 134.
37 greenfeld, Five Roads to Modernity, p. 95. 
38 ibid., pp. 95–96.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/04/2020 04:57:25 |
196 Ioannis Kyriakantonakis 
The basic argument was that france was more catholic than the pope, that it 
constituted a sacred realm and a church in its own right.39 That is, as in many 
cases of shaping early national identity, renunciation of faith was unthinkable. 
Before the enlightenment and era of revolutions, the world order depended on 
religious tenets and political ideas were articulated in religious language, taking 
into account the crucial importance of theological arguments. 
By this token, the Hundred Years’ War was both a religious conflict and a 
clash between nations.40 england became the first modern nation through its 
essential rivalry with the papacy, because of its identification with a religious 
community that was distinct and contrary to Rome (and to france and spain). 
england’s otherness could not, especially in the early stages of its national 
history, manifest itself in an absolutely innovative and modern way. it had to 
be intelligible, and apparently the most effective way for such an argument 
to be accepted was to construct a religious cause and to imagine england as 
a sacred realm and the stronghold of piety.41 That is why the Reformed faith 
became crucial for national identity and england became the protestant nation.42 
However, the significance of protestantism in the emergence of nationalism 
transcended the english case. 
The fundamental transformation of christianity from sacramental religion 
to rationalised faith bore with it a series of concepts, phenomena and moral and 
philosophical reflections that shaped the foundation of the modern world.43 in 
the context of modernity, nationalism emerged as a result of the reshaping and 
reorientation of pre-existing values and languages. in this respect, new readings 
of the old testament highlighted the historical role of chosen peoples, on the 
grounds that the elect took part in a covenant with god, entitled to direct access 
to His Word.44 This direct relationship derives intellectually from the substitution 
of papal supremacy with the authority of the Bible (sola scriptura). protestantism 
rejected most mediatory ecclesiastical institutions, including metaphysical 
mediation of the church through the sacraments and the clergy, as well as sacred 
tradition at large.45 There was no more a privileged strata regarding otherworldly 
39 ibid., p. 97.
40 ibid., p. 95.
41 ibid., p. 63.
42 Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study of its Origins and Background, New York: 
macmillan, 1961, pp. 171, 174.
43 greenfeld, Five Roads to Modernity, p. 52.
44 Kohn, Idea of Nationalism, p. 168.
45 With the significant exception of augustine: “Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi; in interiore 
homine habitat veritas.” charles taylor, The Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity, 
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issues, and only individual piety (no matter how humble in theological training) 
could lead to salvation through ascetic and legalistic patterns of life more 
reminiscent of Judaism than traditional christianity. 
There must be a connection between this religious pattern and the rise of 
nationalism.46 in antiquity, Judaism (and sectarianism) was the most fertile 
cultural ground for ideas of ethnicity to emerge, and these were provocatively 
similar to nationalism. accordingly, on the eve and outset of modernity, 
reformed religion (and revived sectarianism) provided the necessary intellectual 
vehicle for the spirit of the chosen people, that is, the germ of nationalism. in 
england this spirit was not collectivist and did not derive from the sacralisation 
of monarchy, but it was founded on individualism, which led to the elevation of 
the people to the status of an elite. This exalted position originally depended on 
the language of the old testament, and it was not something that “pious simple 
men” did not fight for. The existence of some hundreds of martyrs who faced 
religious persecution from scholastic inquisitors during the reign of mary was 
immediately appreciated and functioned to cement a long-term identification 
between protestant and national causes.47 The virtually unprecedented 
individualism behind their martyrdom, their disregard, even contempt, for 
theology and complex metaphysics, and their conviction that their dignity as 
pious simple men entitled them to read and interpret the Bible and speak out 
against the intellectual pretensions of their oppressors48 became the symbols 
of what was later described as a Western, rational type of nationalism. from a 
theological point of view, such individual interpretations were perhaps simple-
minded, having little to do with theology as an intellectual tradition; that is, 
their metaphysical-philosophical references were ill-founded,49 being reduced to 
practical inferences of a legalistic, utilitarian and rationalised nature. This break 
with metaphysics became very important for the secularised english version 
cambridge: cambridge University press, 1989, pp. 129 and 127–142. Weber, Protestant Ethic, 
pp. 104–105.
46 “The three main ideas of Hebrew nationalism dominated the consciousness of 
[cromwell’s] period: The chosen people idea, the covenant, the messianic expectancy 
[…] The whole thought and style […] was deeply colored with Hebraism.” Kohn, Idea of 
Nationalism, pp. 168–169, 176.
47 greenfeld, Five Roads to Modernity, pp. 55, 60–61.
48 see, in another context, carlo ginsburg, The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a 
Sixteenth-century Miller, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University press, 1992, pp. 8–13. 
49 greenfeld, Five Roads to Modernity, p. 56. This proposition may apply to english martyrs 
or the friuli miller but of course not to the leaders of the Reformation like martin luther, 
who was one of the best theological minds of his time and intellectually superior to most of 
the traditional Roman catholic hierarchy. 
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of nationalism and, of course, for the spirit of rationalism, which was about to 
distinguish Western modernity. 
on the other hand, previous religious idioms did not vanish. england’s 
religious idiosyncrasy was thus viewed as the foundation of national 
distinctiveness. god’s providence for His people was expressed by the rule 
of a charismatic, god-sent Virgin Queen. The central position occupied by 
religion in the nascent english nationalism, and generally in the early stages 
of every national movement, could be viewed as a more or less linguistic-
communicative issue: people had been using religious vocabulary for centuries 
and they conceived the world order in religious terms. secularisation was a 
historical process that could not be completed in a day. Nationalism could not 
emerge ex nihilo; on the contrary it rephrased previous idioms and reintroduced 
ancient rites and perennial credences, though in a different environment and 
for different purposes.50 in fact, protestantism and individualism were the real 
novelties in english culture. on the contrary, the idea of the monarch as the 
token of godly love51 and that of the chosen people were of an ancient/medieval 
fabric, being reused in the early modern context. There is nothing essentially 
modern in the belief in elizabeth’s god-sent charisma, being viewed as a sign 
of divine election, as a verification “that god was english”.52 
Religion in the Ideological Context of Modernity
Having briefly touched on the role of religion in the emergence of nationalism, 
we may proceed to look at religious influences in the revolutionary movements of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. We may consider the ideological context 
relevant to the french and american revolutions, as well as to one of the first 
national uprisings, that is, the greek Revolution. Religious motivations behind 
political incidents have often been obscured, as with the Jansenist contribution 
to the ideological preparation for the french Revolution.53 The ideological line 
that brought together puritan nationalism with the enlightenment and french 
republicanism was not highlighted by nineteenth-century french historiography. 
50 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, p. 68.
51 greenfeld, Five Roads to Modernity, p. 64.
52 The protestants concentrated on the idea of election. The urgency to recognise the signs 
of election shaped their spiritual and social existence on the basis of predestination. However, 
there were several medieval or even ancient precedents for this ideology (Byzantium, france). 
even the idea of predestined nations, endowed with a special mission, was a historical schema 
already outworn in the sixteenth century; see greenfeld, Five Roads to Modernity, pp. 60, 64.
53 conor cruise o’Brien, God Land: Reflections on Religion and Nationalism (cambridge: 
Harvard University press, 1988), pp. 44–45.
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Republican national historians constructed their own historical narrative, within 
which the religious conservatism of catholic puritans found no place.54 However, 
the Jansenists’ opposition to and struggle against the papacy and especially the 
catholic international corps d’elite, the Jesuits, were also influenced by the 
enlightenment. apart from their common enemies, the philosophes and the 
puritans had little in common, but they shared an anti-Jesuit, anti-papal and, 
eventually, anti-monarchical stance, which at some point became part of french 
national discourses.
Radical enlightenment thinkers ultimately argued that the ecumenical 
community of the church and the traditional societies being ruled by powerful 
priesthoods relied on superstition and oppression. it would be better to have 
a church ruled by the state and belonging to the nation. This idea became one 
of the most influential – and one of the few implemented – political agendas 
of the enlightenment. in this respect, greek adherents of the enlightenment 
who were also pioneers of nationalism adopted the idea of a national church, 
following, to a large extent, protestant and english precedents.55 in regard to 
nationalism, protestantism and the enlightenment followed parallel ideological 
courses because they both reserved for the nation a position superior to the 
church. in fact, Republican france seems to be the most extreme case of the 
nation becoming the absolute supreme being and, if we follow Jules michelet’s 
explanation, the nation replaced god “who escaped us”. The motherland filled 
within her children “the immeasurable abyss which extinct christianity has left 
there”.56 as abbé sieyes, influenced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, put it: “The nation 
exists before all, it is the origin of everything […] it is the law itself.”57 But even 
in the early enlightenment, the elevation of a political body to the sphere of the 
divine was apparent, for example, in spinoza’s assertion that “devotion to the 
country is the highest form of piety a man can show”.58
deification of the nation and the romantic stream that originated from 
Rousseau could in the present context be compared to anglo-saxon and puritan 
ideas referring to the nation and religion. as already mentioned, english national 
identity was enhanced by religion, though puritan thought was more conservative 
54 cruise o’Brien, God Land, pp. 45–46.
55 Richard clogg, “anti-clericalism in pre-independence greece, 1750–1821”, in The 
Orthodox Churches and the West, ed. derek Baker (oxford: Blackwell, 1976), pp. 258, 262. 
56 michelet, as cited in ibid., p. 50.
57 sieyes, as cited in ibid., p. 50.
58 spinoza, as cited in ibid., p. 49; see Jonathan israel, A Revolution of the Mind: Radical 
Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy, New Jersey: princeton 
University press, 2009, p. 206.
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in relation to the elevation of the nation into the position of god.59 Rousseau 
initiated a Romantic emotionalism, referring to the adoration of landscapes, the 
country and its natural beauty (which were among the foundations of national 
consciousness). He longed for natural life and liberty, for a spirit and emotion 
freed from the oppression of void pretensions and rationality.60 His naturalistic 
“proto-nationalism” focused on the unconstrained expression of national idioms, 
manners and customs. on the other hand, the spirit of puritanism did not endorse 
emotional life. Nature and its relevance to the flesh were often viewed as corrupt 
deviations from the ascetic ideals of a life detached from sentimental exaltation 
and love of this-worldly issues. patriotism could be regarded such a deviation, a 
distortion of true faith, since it led its disciples to love the creature more than the 
creator. moreover, religious and philosophical individualism, propounded by 
John locke and david Hartley, were not a fertile soil for totalitarian nationalism. 
The persistence of individualism and utilitarianism with their libertarian 
consequences constituted the basis for the distinct type of english nationalism, 
which has been characterised as rational and individualistic.61 
an analysis of the contrast between individualistic lockean rationalism and 
the continental intellectual tradition of cultural relativism and romanticism 
cannot be attempted in the present analysis. a comprehensible schema 
regarding this matter should compare and contrast puritanism (which led to an 
individualistic and rational type of nationalism) and pietism in combination with 
romanticism, which produced the ethnic-organic (german) nationalism.62 This 
contrast could be significant for understanding Western and eastern types of 
nationalism. in a consistent protestant (that is, individualistic) view, community 
was not a value per se but only as far as it was significant for individuals. The 
privileges of the nation were not derived from its nature as an organic-ethnic 
and metaphysical bond, but from its use as a guarantee of individual liberty.63 
an unconditional loyalty to the nation could not flourish in this context. puritan 
patriotism implied that england should be loved “in a rational way”, as a bulwark 
59 Kohn, Idea of Nationalism, pp. 158, 166.
60 maurice cranston, The Romantic Movement, oxford: Blackwell, 1994, pp. 8, 13, 15.
61 Kohn, Idea of Nationalism, pp. 180, 182–183.
62 Kohn, “Western and eastern Nationalism”, p. 165; cranston, Romantic Movement, p. 
15; greenfeld, Five Roads to Modernity, pp. 315, 317, 322. 
63 according to John locke, government is a moral trust dependent on the free consent 
of the governed, whereas the individual’s liberty, dignity and happiness remain the basic 
elements of all social llife. see Kohn, Idea of Nationalism, p. 182. for an alternative historical 
view on individualism’s ontological foundation, see larry siedentop, Inventing the Individual: 
The Origins of Western Liberalism, cambridge: Harvard University press, 2014, pp. 349–363. 
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of rational liberty and, above all, because of its Reformation of the christian 
faith.64 although english patriotism, as expressed, for example, by Hartley and 
samuel taylor coleridge, abandoned the calvinist rejection of natural emotion, 
other important protestant aspects of english nationalism remained intact; 
freedom of conscience came before love of country and the true patriot ought to 
venerate english protestantism – namely the cause of his national identity – and 
its grand battles, the overthrow of papal authority, or the revolution of 1688.65
The considerable role of emotion as acknowledged by romanticism was 
opposed to puritan conservatism. coleridge, however, was an important 
adherent of national character, which he approached with a devotion and 
intensity (therefore with a kind of emotionalism) common to the germans (like 
Johann gottlieb fichte) and to Rousseau. He reserved a high position for culture, 
viewed from the standpoint of national relativism as residing in the nation. 
But this culture, the nation’s distinct way of existence, had to be preserved and 
could only flourish within the institutions of the church, which for this purpose 
had to become a national church.66 Here, coleridge departed from religious 
individualism and argued that truth could only be discovered and conveyed 
by the national church. its indispensable role could be a counter-argument 
to protestantism but only on a superficial level. This reasoning derived from 
nationalism, not from christianity in its ecumenical and metaphysical sense. 
The church was called to transform itself into a national or even a state agent 
that would preserve national interests and was expected to carry out a moral and 
political mission. Religion and its institutions were bound up with the nation, in 
order “to form and train up the people of the country to obedient, free, useful, 
organizable subjects, citizens and patriots, living to the benefit of the state and 
prepared to die for its defence”.67 
in the context of “national churches”, traditional christian virtues were 
transformed and otherworldly ideals were substituted with national heroism and 
the self-sacrifice of patriots. The sanctification of death for country, its elevation 
to a supreme social value (schönes Blut), had been common in the context of 
64 William stafford, “Religion and the doctrine of Nationalism in england at the time of 
the french Revolution and Napoleonic Wars”, in Religion and National Identity, ed. stuart 
mews, oxford: Blackwell, 1982, p. 386.
65 Ibid. For a related discussion see also Jeremy Black, “Confessional State or Elect Nation? 
Religion and Identity in Eighteenth-century England”, in Protestantism and National Identity: 
Britain and Ireland, c.1650–c.1850, ed. Tony Claydon, Ian McBride, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998, pp. 55–56.
66 stafford, “Religion and the doctrine of Nationalism”, pp. 392-393.
67 coleridge, cited in ibid., p. 393.
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german pietism, which constituted one of the pillars of german nationalism. in 
this case, religion was used as practical philosophy, taking the form of certitudo 
salutis in praxis pietatis.68 But this praxis pietatis was not devoid of emotion 
and, in this way, it provided a sui generis language and legitimacy for national 
identity.69 The eventual emergence of these ideas even in the individualistic 
and utilitarian english environment is indicative of a tendency of “rational 
nationalism” to shift towards more organic, “german” concepts: “depend upon 
it, whatever is grand, whatever is truly organic and living, the whole is prior to 
the parts”.70 despite this call to the english nation, individualism persisted in 
the english self-image. 
Religion was very important in shaping revolutionary politics and early 
nationalism on the opposite side of the atlantic.71 in america, christianity 
persisted, perhaps because it had already been essentially reformed in such a way 
that it could speak the new language of nationalism.72 puritanism reigned within 
the discourses of nationalism, as opposed to france, where christianity was 
essentially substituted with patriotism and the nation after the delegitimisation of 
the ancient regime of kings, cardinals and popes. an important religious question 
existed among the puritans,73 which influenced their political aspirations and 
eventual disloyalty to the king of england after he was presented as a papal ally 
and consequently a religious rival. it was not possible for the english to realise the 
degree to which the millenarian expectations of the puritans and their concern 
for the grand design (that of the imposition of the papacy on america) could 
determine the latter’s stance.74 indeed, for the puritans, any negotiation and 
concession regarding their mission would betray their status as the elect. That 
revolutionary america entered into alliance with the catholic french king, and 
also its later tolerance of catholicism (a tolerance for which the english were 
previously derided by the puritans), may, on the other hand, indicate a selective, 
instrumental use of religion on the basis of changing circumstances in politics.75
The latter argument opens the discussion of historical materialism, that 
is, a historicist group of theories and interpretations derived from marxism 
68 greenfeld, Five Roads to Modernity, p. 316.
69 as it had happened in england with protestantism, ibid., pp. 317, 322.
70 coleridge, cited in stafford, “Religion and the doctrine of Nationalism”, p. 394.
71 “The whole destiny of america is contained in the first puritan who landed on these 
shores.” alexis de tocqueville, cited in cruise o’Brien, God Land, p. 43.
72 Kohn, Idea of Nationalism, pp. 268–289; see also Bruce c. daniels, New England Nation: 
The Country the Puritans Built, New York: palgrave macmillan, 2012. 
73 Kohn, Idea of Nationalism, pp. 269, 278.
74 cruise o’Brien, God Land, pp. 54, 56.
75 ibid., p. 59.
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(and especially from marx and engels’ German Ideology); this approach 
has regarded both religion and nationalism as parts of the “superstructure”, 
as “epiphenomena” that only conceal the real – material – causes of human 
behaviour.76 for the purposes of the present essay (and perhaps for those of 
nationalism studies in general), a theory that rejects the significance of cultural 
values as motivations of social behaviour would be of little use.77 
an ideal-type analysis would suggest that in america, religious rivalry, 
manifested as antipopery, was particularly strong and influenced politics at the 
original-revolutionary stages of the national movement; later, particularly after 
the acquisition of independence, it became milder due to many factors, such as the 
administrative needs of a state that obliged it to follow a more tolerant religious 
policy.78 in america, as previously in england, religious conflicts declined and 
religious politics were routinised, after they contributed to cementing national 
identity. in the later stages of their history, both english and american national 
identities turned into civic-political models, after an original religious exaltation 
had functioned as a rite of passage from one allegiance to another; that is, after 
that exaltation had determined the legitimacy of resistance and revolution and 
the corresponding failure of the kings (the stuarts and george iii) to retain their 
status as legitimate sovereigns. “Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to god.” for 
the pious puritan, religion continued to play the role of an ultimate criterion 
of political legitimacy, but even in america its importance declined after the 
fulfilment of its most important calling.
Greece 
Now, although it may be argued that in eastern europe and the Balkans 
nationalism emerged in a distinct way and within a different social and 
cultural milieu, its consequences for orthodox christianity can be compared 
to the process of secularisation that marked Western modernity. The case of 
greece evinces a tendency towards Westernisation, an adherence to aspects 
of european life and an attempt to accommodate rationalised models and 
ideas into societies of a different cultural and political historical background.79 
76 Karl marx, “The german ideology”, in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert tucker, 
New York: Norton, 1978, p. 157.
77 a classic counter-argument to marxism’s pure determinism remains that of max Weber. 
see “author’s introduction”, The Protestant Ethic, p. 27.
78 cf. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, pp. 67–68.
79 Kohn, Idea of Nationalism, p. 164. smith has argued that what distinguished nations 
from ethnie are, in some sense, Western features and qualities, a strong Western cultural 
imprint. Ethnic Origins of Nations, p. 144.
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a major part of greek enlightenment and greek republican thought could 
be understood on the basis of the above Westernisation scheme, given that 
these intellectual and political movements were primarily characterised by the 
admiration for france and the condemnation of the backward state of greece.80 
in the view of such thinkers, a decadent present was usually contrasted to a 
glorious past, that of ancient greece and particularly of athenian democracy.81 
But ironically, the main realm in which the enlightenment project managed 
to be actually implemented was that of religious life and, particularly, the 
institutional and ecclesiastical aspects of orthodoxy. in the realm of politics, 
the republican aspirations of the greek intelligentsia did not come to pass, 
as the independent state was, at least originally, ruled by a totalitarian, non-
constitutional monarchy and a Bavarian regency. This regency effectively 
cooperated with a part of the remaining intelligentsia, which had espoused 
nationalistic and essentially secular ideas for the organisation of the church 
deriving from the enlightenment.
Until the nineteenth century and before the national uprisings in the Balkans, 
the organisation of the orthodox church had preserved a great number of its 
medieval characteristics. its structure, sustained by the ottomans, was founded 
on a reduced version of ecumenicity, on a kind of supernational, post-Byzantine 
commonwealth in which identity was primarily defined by religion. it has been 
argued that the greek character of this commonwealth was not defined by 
national ideals, but by the cultural function of the greek language in which the 
evangelical word was recorded.82 
it is very important that the above concepts are correctly understood and 
historically clarified. The idea that all christians should form a single nation was 
mainly an early ecclesiastical notion that was not borne out in later historical 
reality.83 moreover, ethnic and national differentiation is not absent from early 
80 “Where once governed the wise laws of solon […] now reign ignorance, malice, force, 
wickedness”, Korais, cited in l. s. stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, london: Hurst, 2001, 
p. 149. see also paschalis m. Kitromilides, “Republican aspirations in southeastern europe 
in the age of the french Revolution”, in Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy: Studies 
in the Culture and Political Thought of South-Eastern Europe, aldershot: Variorum, 1994.
81 This comparison was not only a question of the enlightenment. almost all learned greek 
men, particularly those who were familiar with Western admiration of ancient greece, could 
refer to similar historical considerations. see, indicatively, andreas Rhoby, “The ‘friendship’ 
between martin crusius and Theodosios Zygomalas”, Medioevo Greco: Rivista di storia e 
filologia bizantina 5 (2005), pp. 249–266. 
82 see paschalis m. Kitromilides, “orthodox identities in a World of ottoman power”, in 
An Orthodox Commonwealth, aldershot: ashgate Variorum, 2007, pp. 3–11.
83 Herrin, The Formation of Christendom, pp. 444 ff. 
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modern greek texts coming from constantinople. and although historical 
analogies should be taken into account, it seems possible to discern the existence 
of greek ideology at least since late Byzantium. in the ottoman period, greek 
historical consciousness was shaped on the basis of Byzantine memories among 
the learned but also among the popular strata. on the other hand, it must be 
admitted that greek culture preserved elements of universality and greek 
education was prevalent among Balkan intellectuals of every ethnic background. 
even dositej obradović, the founding father of serbian literature, attended a 
greek school.84 The patriarch of constantinople was still at the centre of an 
ecumene as the bishop of the most important city of the orthodox christian 
world. Normally, he had to be “greek” or at least be educated in greek learning 
and theology, which was regarded as a great intellectual virtue. sixteenth-
century chronicles of the church present a serbian occupant of the patriarchal 
throne as a historical mistake, a caricature, unable to read the scriptures and 
attend the liturgy.85 
Nevertheless, the spirit of a respublica christiana was identified, or at least 
preserved within the imperial administrative schema; even after the collapse 
of Byzantium, ottomans respected this ecumenical character of christianity 
by recognising the patriarch of constantinople as the leader of the orthodox 
religious group, in which most christian populations were gradually absorbed. of 
course, this was for the most part an administrative and spiritual leadership that 
did not abolish ethno-linguistic boundaries and diverging historical memories. 
for most of the orthodox clergy, but also for a large part of the greek population, 
ottoman rule prevented the papacy from prevailing in Byzantium, particularly 
after the two churches had been reunited due to the edict of the council of 
florence. The latinisation of the greek orthodox church was regarded as the 
worst possible scenario for greek otherness and identity, so the greek hierarchy 
of constantinople regarded the ottoman empire as a convenient historical 
circumstance for the survival of “Byzance après Byzance”, at least in spiritual 
84 stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, p. 148; paschalis m. Kitromilides, The Enlightenment 
as Social Criticism: Iosipos Moisiodax and Greek Culture in the Eighteenth Century, New Jersey: 
princeton University press, 1992, pp. 23–26, 29–50. 
85 “Historia patriarchica constantinopoleos”, Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae 
vol. 28, ed. emmanuel Bekker, Bonn: Weber, 1849, pp. 112–115. greek eloquence was a 
great intellectual virtue for the polyglot phanariot upper class. see demetrios procopiu, 
“Επιτετμημένη Επαρίθμησις των κατά τον παρελθόντα αιώνα λογίων Γραικών” [a concise 
catalogue enumeration of greek scholars of the previous century], Bibliotheca Graeca, vol. 
11, ed. Αlbert fabricius, Hamburg: christian liebezeit, 1722, pp. 770ff. 
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affairs.86 Not only did the patriarchate survive under the turks, but it was also 
granted more power over the christian populations.87 
given the above clarifications, it is understandable that even as late as the 
nineteenth century there could be a fundamental antinomy (varying according 
to which social or intellectual context we refer to) between orthodoxy and 
nationalism, as the “imagined community” of the nation could be destructive for 
the “imagined community” of religion.88 Now the above-mentioned antinomy was 
concretely (and perhaps by way of a historical paradox) expressed in the conflict 
between an enlightenment version of nationalism and orthodox ecumenicity. 
adamantios Korais opposed the preservation of the authority of the patriarchate 
in the independent greek state, the intellectual life of which he had considerably 
influenced. on the other hand, constantinople had been clearly opposed to the 
political acts and ideas that derived from nationalism and republicanism, including 
the greek Revolution.89 for the followers of Korais (mainly Theoklitos farmakidis, 
who was responsible for the first ecclesiastical reformation in independent greece) 
ecclesiastical ecumenicity was a concept devoid of meaning.90 
86 This view is generally held by recent historians to a degree that it can be regarded as 
a historiographical orthodoxy. However, there are certain indications that should make us 
cautious. The ottoman advance resulted in a series of violent war incidents in a number 
of important Byzantine cities (constantinople, Thessaloniki, euripos) and islands such 
as cyprus, crete and corfu, not to speak of serbian resistance against the sultans. greek 
resistance cannot be regarded exclusively as a result of Venetian enforcement, as it was alleged 
in some sources of the time and has been repeated by modern historians. overall, ottoman 
expansion from the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries (and in a few cases to the seventeenth 
century) could hardly be described as a substitution of one administrative elite by another. it 
comes closer to the medieval historical idea of the collapse of a world and the birth of a new 
one, although continuities should not of course be excluded from the whole picture. 
87 stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, pp. 149–150, 281.
88 as stavrianos put it, it was “the age of Theocracy superseded by the age of Nationalism”. 
The Balkans since 1453, p. 222.
89 modern historians have regarded this policy of the patriarchate as a clear indication 
of the non-national ideology of the church. it has become a commonplace to state that the 
orthodox church opposed the enlightenment and Revolution, but in both cases the issues 
seem to be much more complex. one has to examine the circumstances of these policies, 
whether they were the result of a free choice or not, and also to bear in mind the retaliations 
that the greek people of constantinople suffered in the aftermath of the rebellions in the 
danubian principalities and the peloponnese. for several aspects of the relationship between 
the church and the enlightenment, see paschalis m. Kitromilides (ed.), Enlightenment and 
Religion in the Orthodox World, oxford: Voltaire foundation, 2016. 
90 elli skopetea, Το “Πρότυπο Βασιλείο” και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα: Όψεις του εθνικού προβλήματος 
στην Ελλάδα (1830–1880) [The “model kingdom” and the great idea: views of the national 
question in greece (1830–1880)], athens: polytypo, 1988, pp. 119–134. 
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according to this nationalist vision, a radical reformation in religion was 
projected as indispensable in satisfying the needs of the national state. as a 
result, this time the prevailing criteria for the organisation of the church were not 
religious and ecclesiastical, but national. consequently, a national autocephalous 
church had first of all to be established, that is, a church in secession from the 
traditional axis of orthodoxy headed by the ecumenical patriarchate, and 
secondly, the monasteries and their influence had to be weakened. Theological 
instruction was to be modernised on the basis of enlightenment ideals and 
nationalist requirements. evidently, this reformation consisted in an essential 
“protestantisation” of the church,91 which was also pursued by the Bavarian 
regency (the tendency of enlightened intelligentsia to adopt protestant positions 
in religious matters, namely the merging of enlightenment and protestant 
causes, has already been noted above). 
This administrative and ideological framework was determined by the 
necessities of state nationalism and political power.92 secession from the 
patriarchate was not a mere administrative act, but a radical break with the 
91 in this context, one can refer to the emphasis on religious “consciousness” at the expense 
of tradition (which was Byzantine); the tendency to regard the church as a mere bearer and 
repository of dogmas and the administrative system of a permanent synod presided over by 
the king. see christos Yiannaras, Ορθοδοξία και Δύση στη νεότερη Ελλάδα [orthodoxy and the 
west in modern greece], athens: domos, 1999, pp. 266–271; skopetea, Το “Πρότυπο Βασιλείο” 
[The “model kingdom”], p. 129. to a certain extent, the polemics against episcopal authority 
and monasticism and the tendencies of rationalisation in dogma and ecclesiastical practice 
could be regarded as recurrent religious and ideological phenomena. after all, reformation 
ideas in christianity, despite the different historical circumstances in which they emerged, 
should generally share at least some common demands. in this respect, the cases of plethon 
gemistos and cyril lucaris are exemplary. Both belong to the type of humanist and reformer, 
sharing a number of ideas about the need to change the orthodox church and greek society 
in general. These ideas were later on espoused by adamantios Korais. for plethon, see Vojtech 
Hladky, The Philosophy of Gemistos Plethon: Platonism in Late Byzantium, between Hellenism 
and Orthodoxy, farnham: ashgate, 2014, pp. 11–19; Niketas siniossoglou, Radical Platonism 
in Byzantium: Illumination and Utopia in Gemistos Plethon, cambridge: cambridge University 
press, 2011, pp. 327–403. for lucaris’ reformation agenda, see gunnar Hering, Ökumenisches 
Patriarchat und europäische Politik, 1620–1638, Wiesbaden: steiner, 1968; Vassileios tsakiris, 
“The ‘ecclesiarum Belgicarum confessio’ and the attempted ‘calvinisation’ of the orthodox 
church under patriarch cyril lucaris”, Journal of Ecclesiastical History 63 (2012), pp. 475–487. 
92 in a similar way, church and nation became one in every nation-state in the Balkans, and 
in most cases (serbia, Romania, Bulgaria) this identification reached the level of the elevation 
of the regional churches to patriarchates, a fact that was regarded as a critical affirmation of 
national identity and autonomy. Kitromilides, “imagined communities and the origins of 
the National Question in the Balkans”, Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy, pp. 183–184. 
in the case of Bulgaria, the struggle against turkish political domination was paralleled by a 
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Byzantine tradition of ecumenicity, presupposing the articulation of a different 
ecclesiastical history and the rejection of Byzantium as an image of the greek 
past. Korais, influenced by Voltaire and montesquieu, was rather hostile to 
Byzantium, regarding the Byzantine period as a decadent phase of subjugation in 
Hellenic history, not really distinct from ottoman rule. His position constituted 
the mainstream ideology of the classicist state during the first decades of its 
existence, and it was never fully abandoned.93 in fact, after the canonical 
relations of the church of greece with the patriarchate of constantinople were 
reestablished (with the patriarchal decree of 1850), Byzantium was restituted 
as one of the three pillars of national history and unity. 
moreover, anti-clericalism was prevalent among the greek intelligentsia 
because it was inherent in their ideology of the enlightenment and nationalism, 
on the one hand, and because of the policy of the church during ottoman rule, 
on the other. it should be admitted that the hierarchy was prone to condemning 
revolutionary movements (as the text of the Paternal Exhortation characteristically 
indicated),94 and that many of its members enjoyed high social and economic status 
at the expense of the greek population. simony and corruption were common 
phenomena among the highest ranks of the ecclesiastical structure.95 However, the 
anti-clericalism of such intellectuals as Korais, Rhigas and the anonymous author 
of Hellenic Nomarchy was not always paralleled by the prevalence of such attitudes 
among the masses of the greek people, and it must be noted that there exists little 
evidence of actual religious unbelief.96 This fact is crucial for understanding the 
struggle against greek ecclesiastical control. The first victory for Bulgarian nationalism was 
the establishment of a national church. stavrianos, Balkans, pp. 371, 375.
93 alexis politis, “from christian Roman emperors to the glorious greek ancestors”, 
in Byzantium and Modern Greek Identity, ed. david Ricks and paul magdalino, aldershot: 
ashgate, 1998, pp. 1–14. see also george Huxley, “aspects of modern greek Historiography 
of Byzantium”, in Ricks and magdalino, Byzantium and Modern Greek Identity, pp. 15–23; 
paschalis m. Kitromilides, “on the intellectual content of greek Nationalism: paparrigopoulos, 
Byzantium and the great idea”, in Ricks and magdalino, Byzantium and Modern Greek 
Identity, pp. 27–33; fotios dimitrakopoulos, Βυζάντιο και νεοελληνική διανόηση στα μέσα 
του δεκάτου ενάτου αιώνος [Byzantium and modern greek intellectual life in the middle of the 
nineteenth century], athens: Kastaniotis, 1996, pp. 59–70, 72–74, 77–79 and passim. 
94 The Paternal Exhortation was an encyclical letter condemning revolutionary ideas and 
asserting that the ottoman empire was ordained by god. clogg, “anti-clericalism in pre-
independence greece”, pp. 258–259. in view of the radical policies of the french Revolution, 
it is unsurprising that this condemnation was issued. it would be paradoxical to expect the 
ecclesiastical leaders to adhere to ideas preaching atheism and the very abolition of the church. 
95 stavrianos, Balkans since 1453, p. 150.
96 clogg, “anti-clericalism in pre-independence greece”, p. 272.
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religious allegiance of greek combatants in the war of independence – the battle 
cry “fight for faith and motherland” – and the way in which the greek population 
defined its identity, even in the nineteenth century. 
The question of greek identity and its religious, ethnic and national constituents 
is a complicated one, particularly when it concerns the masses of anonymous 
people. The modernist position has approached the issue by proposing a historical 
dichotomy, or a dualism of the religious and the pre-modern vis-à-vis national and 
modern identities. according to this theory, the tenet that orthodox christianity 
and the church had played a major role in preserving collective identity under the 
ottomans is modified to suggest that the preserved identities were religious and 
not national. i believe that such a distinction can be transcended. of course, the 
identity to which the church was linked was not national in the sense in which 
we currently understand the term (that is, related to the character of modern 
societies). But in the same way it was not strictly religious; it was not limited to 
religious dogmas and rites. one could regard religious identity at this time as 
containing, or perhaps concealing, many of the elements that nowadays refer to 
national consciousness. pre-modern religious identity was much more profound 
and comprehensive than modern religious identity. The orthodox church was 
not only a religious institution of the ottoman state serving spiritual life, but 
also a historical institution antedating the ottomans and conveying a cultural 
tradition of its own. for the greek people, orthodoxy was a fundamental way to 
preserve and manifest their culture and exist as a nation before nationalism. in a 
durée perspective and in order to avoid anachronisms, the greek nation should 
be distinguished both from a modern nation and a modern religious group.
Upon entering a revolutionary struggle for an independent state, the 
greek people referred to religion as the main pillar of their identity. in the 
first revolutionary constitutional assembly, held at epidaurus in 1821–1822, 
that identity was primarily defined as christian orthodox. “all the indigenous 
inhabitants of the territory of greece who believe in christ are greeks.” one 
could add innumerable religious ideals and symbols of the revolt that testify to the 
existence of a “demotic model” of nation deriving from orthodoxy (contrary to 
the “civic model” of nationhood that greek intellectuals had borrowed from the 
french Revolution). “What mattered to the orthodox clergy, artisans, shepherds 
and peasants […] was their greek orthodox descent and local cultures, their 
popular revolts […] and local histories which opposed orthodoxy to islam.”97 
clearly they were two distinct ideological realms in nineteenth-century 
Hellenism: on the one hand an orthodox-Byzantine one and, on the other, a 
97 smith, Ethnic Origins of Nations, p. 145.
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neoclassical one, which was originally adopted by the greek state. subsequently, 
orthodoxy and the nation were presented as each other’s guardians, inseparably 
coupled in a way that departed both from the secular ideals of the enlightenment 
and the ecumenical character of the church.98 Unfortunately, the uses of 
orthodoxy by the state were often petty and banal, as demonstrated by the 
Helleno-christian ideals of the military regime of 1967–1974, or by some 
caricaturesque figures of contemporary greek party politics. 
***
This article has focused only on Western examples and christianity, suggesting 
their primary importance in the studies of nationalism. it has tried to describe 
a process of historical transformation, that is, to show in what ways religion 
was integrated into national identity as a vehicle to achieve secular aims. all in 
all, it was religion that was modified by and incorporated into the discourses 
of nationalism. This does not mean that the historical relationship was not 
complicated: a more comprehensive consideration of particular examples would 
be needed, given that the recurrence of historical phenomena permits a certain 
degree of generalisation in the social sciences. on the other hand, there will 
always be elements of the larger picture to consider in greater depth.
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Hellenic Open University
98 skopetea, Το “Πρότυπο Βασιλείο” [The “model kingdom”], pp. 122–123.
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